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MASSACHUSETTS’ NEW PREDATORY 
LENDING LAW AND THE EXPANDING RIFT 
BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE LENDING 
PROTECTION 
Laura Dietrich*
Abstract: Predatory lending practices in the mortgage industry cost 
Americans an estimated $9.1 billion each year. Predatory lending steals 
hard-earned equity from individuals and disproportionately affects mi- 
norities, low-income families, the elderly, and their respective communi- 
ties. On August 9, 2004, the Massachusetts legislature approved legislation 
to combat this growing problem. This recent legislation provides strong 
protection against predatory lending. Despite this positive step, na- 
tionally-chartered institutions remain virtually unregulated as a result of 
weak federal protections and the unwillingness of federal agencies to 
investigate or prosecute predatory lending practices. This Note concludes 
that true reform in lending requires a greater delegation of regulatory 
authority to the states or, in the alternative, stronger federal protections 
that match the efforts of states such as Massachusetts. 
Introduction 
 Monica Sudler is a 44 year old Boston resident who makes over 
$50,000 a year.1 Sudler sought a $10,000 loan to do home repairs, but 
the lending institution she approached told her that she did not make 
enough money to take out such a loan.2 Rather than allowing Ms. 
Sudler to take out the small loan she requested, the lending institu-
tion talked her into reªnancing her house with a $113,551 loan at 
10.48% interest, three points higher than the mortgage she already 
had.3 When Ms. Sudler realized that the reªnanced loan was more 
harmful than helpful, she attempted to get out of the equity-stripping 
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1 Andrew J. Manuse, Predatory Loans Seen as on Rise in Boston, Boston Herald, Feb. 12, 
2004, at 41. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
169 
170 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 26:169 
loan, but in doing so she was forced to pay more than $10,000 in pre-
payment penalties.4 “I was bamboozled, hoodwinked, tarred and 
feathered,” she said.5 She warned those considering a loan, “[l]ook 
behind every smile, otherwise, you won’t have a happy ending.”6
 Unfortunately, Ms. Sudler’s experience with lending is not unique.7 
Predatory lending practices in the private consumer home mortgage 
industry have a devastating impact on the lives of many homeowners 
in America.8 Unfair fees and unjustiªably high interest rates have cost 
American homeowners an estimated $9.1 billion each year.9 The ex-
treme cost of abusive lending practices drains unsuspecting or misled 
borrowers of the equity in their homes.10 The result is often foreclo-
sure.11 Additionally, unscrupulous lenders target those who are least 
able to shoulder the immense burden of predatory loans.12 Predatory 
lenders target minorities and their communities, homeowners in low-
income neighborhoods, and the elderly.13 The net social cost of preda-
tory lending extends far beyond individual victims, as vulnerable mi-
nority and low-income communities become wastelands of boarded-up 
houses and broken dreams.14
 Over the past decade, predatory lending abuses have increased 
dramatically.15 The greater Boston area has experienced particularly 
shocking increases in predatory lending.16 In an attempt to confront 
the overwhelming problem of predatory lending, the Massachusetts 
legislature approved the Predatory Home Loan Practices Act (PHLPA 
or the Act) on August 9, 2004.17 The Act, which became effective on 
November 7, 2004, constitutes a substantial step forward in the pro-
                                                                                                                      
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Manuse, supra note 1, at 41. 
7 See Eric Stein, Coal. for Responsible Lending, Quantifying the Economic 
Cost of Predatory Lending 2 (2001), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/ 
pdfs/Quant10-01.pdf. 
8 Id. 
9 Id; see infra Part I.B. (discussing the impact of predatory lending on American home-
owners). 
10 Stein, supra note 7, at 11. 
11 Id. 
12 See infra Part I.B. 
13 See infra Part I.B. 
14 See infra Part I.B. 
15 Ass’n of Cmty. Org. for Reform Now, Separate and Unequal: Predatory Lending 
in America 13 (2004), available at http://www.acorn.org/ªleadmin/Community_Reinvest-  
ment/Reports/S_and_E_2004/separate_and_unequal_2004.pdf [hereinafter ACORN]. 
16 See infra notes 85–87 and accompanying text. 
17 Predatory Home Loan Practices Act, 2004 Mass. Acts 268. 
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tection of Bay State borrowers from predatory lenders.18 Though 
mitigated by preemptive federal regulations that restrict the scope of 
state predatory lending laws,19 the Act is important because the prob-
lem of predatory lending continues to grow in magnitude.20 In the 
absence of meaningful federal lending protections, states must con-
tinue to pass legislation that protects borrowers from abusive lending 
practices without inhibiting lenders from providing loans to borrow-
ers with imperfect credit.21
 This Note examines federal and state legislation to determine the 
most effective and appropriate means for preventing future borrowers 
from being similarly harmed by the misleading and often blatantly 
deceptive practices of predatory lenders. This Note limits its discus-
sion of predatory lending practices to those practices that are most 
common within the private consumer mortgage industry.22 Part I of 
this Note describes common predatory lending practices in more de-
tail and highlights those who are victimized by these practices. Part II 
considers federal and state anti-predatory lending legislation and the 
relationship between PHLPA and federal lending protections. Part II 
also discusses the impact of federal preemption rules that limit the 
scope of PHLPA and considers a variety of arguments for and against 
federal preemption. Part III examines the speciªc terms of PHLPA 
and the likelihood of the Act’s effectiveness in comparison with other 
state and federal protections. This Note concludes that PHLPA is 
likely to be effective in combating the most common forms of preda-
                                                                                                                      
18 See id. 
19 See infra Part II.D. 
20 See infra Part II.D. 
21 See, e.g., Predatory Home Loan Practices Act, 2004 Mass. Acts 268, § 6; Predatory 
Lending Act, 1999 N.C. Sess. Laws 332. 
22 In addition to predatory lending that occurs within the private consumer mortgage 
industry, another damaging form of predatory lending is payday lending. See Mass. Div. of 
Banks, Internet Payday Loans: Risky Business, May 30, 2000, http://www.mass.gov/dob/pay 
day.htm (last modiªed Aug. 3, 2004). This type of predatory lending provides advances on 
the borrower’s paycheck and generally charges outrageous rates of interest. Id. (noting that 
interest rates of online payday lenders typically are between 300% and 500% and also point-
ing out one lender who charges an astounding 6,205% in interest). The advent of the Inter-
net created a new means for payday lenders to reach potential victims while at the same time 
decreasing the government’s ability to prohibit or regulate this form of lending. See id. For 
example, although no payday lenders are physically located in Massachusetts—due to laws 
restricting capping interest rates on small loans—this form of predatory lending continues to 
harm Bay State residents through the aggressive marketing strategies of online payday lend-
ers. Id. The efforts of online payday lenders are unchecked because the online payday lend-
ers are not licensed by the state’s regulatory agency, the Massachusetts Division of Banks, and 
are therefore not subject to Massachusetts’ laws and regulations. Id. 
172 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 26:169 
tory lending and that Congress should take steps to expand the scope 
of protective anti-predatory lending acts as Massachusetts has. 
I. Predatory Lending Practices and Their Victims 
A. What Is Predatory Lending? 
 Within the private consumer mortgage industry, nearly all preda-
tory loans are subprime loans.23 Nonetheless, subprime loans serve 
the important role of allowing individuals with imperfect credit who 
do not qualify for a prime loan to obtain loans.24 Subprime loans have 
higher interest rates than prime loans to account for the higher risk 
that lending to borrowers with imperfect credit entails.25 These loans 
become predatory when the “loan terms or conditions become abu-
sive or when borrowers who should qualify for credit on better terms 
are targeted instead for higher cost loans.”26
 A large proportion of subprime borrowers are given higher in-
terest rates on mortgage loans than those rates for which they qual-
ify.27 The predatory practice of charging a higher interest rate than is 
justiªed by a borrower’s credit history is referred to as a “Rate-Risk 
Disparity.”28 In 2001, Fannie Mae estimated that up to half of sub-
prime borrowers would have qualiªed for a lower cost mortgage.29 
                                                                                                                      
23 ACORN, supra note 15, at 6. It is important to emphasize that the inverse is not true. 
Id. Not all subprime loans are predatory. Id. Nonetheless, since a great deal of subprime 
loans are predatory and because of the impossibility of researching every individual’s sub-
prime loan terms, research in this ªeld examines subprime loans generally to quantify and 
study the extent of the predatory lending problem. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 7. The prob-
lem of measuring the extent of predatory lending is increased by the fact that even those 
borrowers who are aware that they have been victims of predatory lending are often un-
willing to report such abuse. See Chris Reidy, New Law Aims to Halt Predatory Home Loans, 
Boston Globe, Aug. 11, 2004, at C1. Banking Commissioner Steven Antonakes noted 
many people who realize that they have an excessively high-cost loan are “too embar-
rassed” to come forward. Id. 
24 ACORN, supra note 15, at 6. “Prime loans” are conventional loans that possess stan-
dard bank interest rates. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 See Stein, supra note 7, at 2. 
29 ACORN, supra note 15, at 6. Fannie Mae was established in 1938 by the federal gov-
ernment “to expand the ºow of mortgage money by creating a secondary market.” Fannie 
Mae, Understanding Fannie Mae, http://www.fanniemae.com/aboutfm/understanding/ 
(last modiªed Jan. 18, 2005). In 1968, Fannie Mae became a private company and is today 
a publicly traded corporation. Id. Nonetheless, Fannie Mae has not eschewed all connec-
tions with the federal government as it continues to operate under a congressional charter 
that “directs [Fannie Mae] to channel [their] efforts into increasing the availability and 
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Additionally, Freddie Mac’s research indicates that as many as 35% of 
subprime borrowers had credit ratings that would have qualiªed for a 
prime loan.30 In the case of one major predatory lender, 46% of sub-
prime borrowers had good credit and qualiªed for prime loans.31
 The practice of providing borrowers with higher interest rates 
than are justiªed by their credit rating is exacerbated by an incentive 
system that directly rewards this behavior.32 In as many as 90% of sub-
prime loans, loan brokers are rewarded with kickbacks, known as 
“Yield Spread Premiums,” if the brokers place borrowers in loans with 
higher interest rates than those for which the borrower qualiªes.33 
The greater the “spread” between the interest rate that the borrower 
qualiªes for and the higher interest rate that the borrower agrees to 
pay, the greater the kickback that the broker receives.34 Consequently, 
mortgage brokers are not only provided with strong incentives to 
“sell” loans to borrowers that have higher interest rates than are war-
ranted, but brokers are encouraged to offer the highest possible in-
terest rate that they can convince a borrower to take.35 Yield Spread 
Premiums are “inherently deceptive to the borrower” because no bor-
                                                                                                                      
affordability of homeownership for low, moderate, and middle-income Americans.” Id. In 
keeping with their goal of increasing affordable housing, Fannie Mae conducts research 
on predatory lending and is often a leader in initiatives to stop predatory lending. See 
Ass’n of Cmty. Org. for Reform Now, Drained Wealth, Withered Dreams II 8 
(2004), available at http://www.acorn.org/ªleadmin/Predatory_Lending/Drained_Wealth 
_2004.pdf [hereinafter Drained Wealth]. For example, in 2004, Fannie Mae, along with 
Freddie Mac, announced that they would no longer purchase subprime loans that contain 
mandatory arbitration clauses, which are thought by some to be abusive. Id.; see infra Part 
I.A. (discussing the harms of mandatory arbitration clauses).
30 See ACORN, supra note 15, at 6. Freddie Mac, like Fannie Mae, is a corporation that 
was chartered by Congress in 1970 to stabilize the mortgage market and increase opportu-
nities for affordable rental housing. Freddie Mac, Our Mission and Values, http://www. 
freddiemac.com/corporate/about/who_we_are/mission.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2005). 
31 ACORN, supra note 15, at 6–7. A senior executive of HSBC admitted in 2002 that the 
major subprime lender that his bank had just acquired, Household International, had 
given subprime loans to people with “A” credit—the highest credit ranking—46% of the 
time. Id. Household International settled out of court for $485 million for their predatory 
lending practices. Id. at 7. 
32 See Ctr. for Responsible Lending, Yield Spread Premiums: A Powerful Incen-
tive for Equity Theft 1 (2004), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/ 
ib011-YSP_Equity_Theft-0604.pdf [hereinafter Yield Spread Premiums]. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 See id. The Center for Responsible Lending reported that the average Yield Spread 
Premium is approximately $1,850 per loan. Id. at 2. This constitutes the largest component 
of a mortgage broker’s compensation. Id. Consequently, the Yield Spread Premium pro-
vides a very strong incentive for brokers to provide excessively high interest rates that have 
no relationship to a borrower’s credit risk. See id. 
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rower who understood that they were being overcharged would ac-
cept the higher interest rate.36 The Center for Responsible Lending 
estimates that the inºation in interest rates caused by Yield Spread 
Premiums costs 600,000 families $2.9 billion each year.37
 One reason that brokers are able to convince borrowers to accept 
higher interest rates than are warranted by their credit is that borrow-
ers are not adequately informed about the state of their credit.38 For 
example, one study found that half of African-Americans with good 
credit thought that they had bad credit.39 These misperceptions may 
cause borrowers to believe that they have no other choice than to ac-
cept the excessively high interest rates that are offered by unscrupu-
lous brokers.40 Furthermore, the tactics employed by predatory lend-
ers are speciªcally designed to deceive borrowers into believing that 
they cannot qualify for a better loan than is being offered.41
 In addition to convincing borrowers to agree to loan terms that 
entail excessive interest rates, many lenders use outright deception 
with so-called “bait and switch” tactics.42 In “bait and switch” cases, 
subprime borrowers are advised by predatory lenders that the major 
terms of a loan are “x,” yet, at closing, the terms are much worse than 
“x.”43 The California Reinvestment Committee’s 2001 study of sub-
prime lending practices in the Los Angeles, Oakland, Sacramento, 
and San Diego areas found that this type of ambush lending occurred 
in the majority of instances of subprime lending.44 This study indi-
cated that nearly seven out of ten respondents “reported that they saw 
key loan terms suddenly change for the worse at closing.”45 A study of 
                                                                                                                      
36 See Stein, supra note 7, at 11. 
37 Yield Spread Premiums, supra note 32, at 1. 
38 Drained Wealth, supra note 29, at 31. 
39 Id. 
40 See id. Misunderstandings about one’s own credit are often generated by a bor-
rower’s failure to notice and correct errors in one’s credit report that make the borrower’s 
credit rating appear lower than it actually is. Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Press Release, Cal. Reinvestment Comm., Predatory Lenders Feed on the Poor, Sen-
iors, and People of Color (Nov. 29, 2001), available at http://www.calreinvest.org/Pred 
atoryLending/Top10PredatoryPractices7.2.html. 
43 See id. 
44 See id. 
45 Id. The reported prevalence of “bait and switch” tactics is even more shocking for 
certain groups of people. See id. For example, it was found that eight in ten African-
American subprime borrowers interviewed reported that key terms in their loans had sud-
denly changed at closing. Id. The prevalence of lenders’ use of “bait and switch” tactics was 
also higher than the general population for borrowers age 55 and older. Id. (ªnding that 
more than seven out of ten subprime borrowers interviewed who were 55 and older had 
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subprime lending practices in South Central Pennsylvania similarly 
found that 71.4% of borrowers surveyed reported that loan terms 
were different at closing than what they had been led to believe.46 
Though all predatory lending is unjust, this form of blatant fraud is 
particularly unconscionable and disturbing.47
 Another frequent abuse in the private consumer mortgage indus-
try is the charging of unjustiªably high fees on subprime loans.48 Two 
common types of fees that are tacked onto subprime mortgages are 
prepayment penalties and single premium insurance plans.49 Pre-
payment penalties charge borrowers high fees for paying off a loan 
before the term of the loan has ended.50 Consequently, these penal-
ties often force subprime borrowers to retain extremely high interest 
rates even after the borrowers have established good credit and would 
otherwise be able to reªnance into a prime loan.51
 The other frequently peddled fee is the single premium insur-
ance plan.52 This fee purports to insure the amount of the loan in 
case the borrower dies or becomes disabled.53 Single premium insur-
ance plans are abusive because—unlike insurance coverage that is 
paid on a monthly basis—all of the premiums are due up front and 
are ªnanced into the loan amount.54 Consequently, for a typical sin-
                                                                                                                      
reported being the victim of these tactics). The California Reinvestment Committee’s 
ªndings on the effects of predatory lending on California communities emphasize the 
disparate impact of predatory lending on the poor, the elderly, and minority groups. See id. 
The disparate impact of predatory lending on certain vulnerable populations is a major 
concern and a recurrent theme in most studies of the effects of predatory lending. For a 
fuller discussion of this widely studied phenomenon, see infra Part I.B. 
46 Ass’n of Cmty. Org. for Reform Now, Predatory Lending in South Central 
Pennsylvania: A Review of Rising Foreclosure Filings and the Relationship to 
Predatory Lending 2 (2003), available at http://www.acorn.org/ªleadmin/Predatory_ 
Lending/FINAL_REPORT.pdf. Out of the 71.4% of the borrowers who indicated that they 
had been misled about the terms of the loan, “over half received a higher interest rate 
than they expected, 10% had a different loan amount and 7% had higher fees than ex-
pected.” Id. 
47 See id. 
48 See Ctr. for Responsible Lending, Prepayment Penalties in Subprime Loans 1 
(2005), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/ib008-PPP_in_Subprime_Loans 
-0604.pdf [hereinafter Prepayment Penalties]. Prepayment penalties are rarely attached to 
prime, or conventional, home mortgage loans. Id. 
49 Id.; Stein, supra note 7, at 5–6. 
50 See Prepayment Penalties, supra note 48, at 1. 
51 Id. 
52 Stein, supra note 7, at 5–6. 
53 Id. at 5. 
54 Id. Additional indirect evidence of the abusive nature of the single premium insur-
ance plan is the fact that they are generally not offered in the prime mortgage market 
where borrowers are thought to have more information and bargaining power. See id. at 6. 
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gle premium insurance plan with ªve years of coverage, it is unlikely 
that the premiums will be paid off by the time the coverage expires.55 
Essentially, the borrower cannot receive a beneªt from single pre-
mium insurance because the coverage typically wears off before it can 
protect the loan.56 It is widely believed that lenders use deceptive 
means to “sell” single premium insurance plans.57 An industry-funded 
study in 1994 found that nearly “40% of borrowers either did not 
know they had received credit insurance or thought that the credit 
insurance was required or strongly recommended by their creditor.”58
 The harmful nature of individual predatory lending terms is of-
ten exacerbated by the combination of several predatory terms into a 
single subprime loan agreement.59 For example, prepayment penal-
ties and single premium insurance plans often accompany excessively 
high interest rates.60 The combination of high interest rates and ex-
cessive fees can be debilitating for struggling and ªnancially stable 
families alike.61 The Center for Responsible Lending provides the fol-
lowing hypothetical as an illustration of the manner in which high 
fees and interest rates typically affect subprime mortgage borrowers: 
An African-American family gets a subprime mortgage loan 
for $150,000 with a 12% interest rate. After making timely 
payments for three years, they realize they can qualify for a 
better loan. However, when the family tries to reªnance, they 
                                                                                                                      
55 Id. at 5. 
56 Id. 
57 See Stein, supra note 7, at 6–7. 
58 Id. The problems associated with single premium insurance plans have been some-
what alleviated by strong pressure from governmental agencies and consumer advocacy 
groups. ACORN, supra note 15, at 53. Signiªcantly, the Federal Reserve implemented 
changes in its regulations in October, 2002 to include single premium insurance plan fees 
in the calculus for determining whether a loan is restricted under the federal Home Own-
ership Equity Protection Act (HOEPA). Id.; see infra Part II.A. for further discussion on 
HOEPA. By the time these regulations were implemented, many lenders had already 
“bowed to public pressure and stopped ªnancing [single premium insurance plans].” 
ACORN, supra note 15, at 53. Despite this progress, it is important to continue to be aware 
of the abusive potential of such fees because, since the passage of the Federal Reserve 
regulations, lenders have attempted to re-package single premium insurance plans into 
fees with other names such as “single premium life insurance.” See id. Additionally, it is 
likely that media and government pressure will diminish and that the regulations—or the 
enforcement of them—will become more lax. See id. Consequently, continued awareness of 
these fees and the effectiveness of laws and regulations in sidelining fees of this nature is 
necessary. 
59 See Prepayment Penalties, supra note 48, at 1. 
60 See id. 
61 See id. 
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discover their existing loan comes with a hefty prepayment 
penalty—adding up to 5% of their loan balance, or about 
$7,500. The family is forced to choose between paying the 
penalty out of their equity or continuing to pay 12% interest 
for two more years.62
This example demonstrates how the combination of multiple preda-
tory terms in a subprime mortgage agreement can compound the 
problems for borrowers.63
 An additional form of predatory lending in the private consumer 
mortgage industry is the inclusion of a mandatory arbitration clause 
in subprime mortgage agreements.64 Mandatory arbitration clauses 
stipulate that all disputes must be arbitrated and that borrowers must 
take disputes to arbitration rather than their tribunal of choice.65 
These clauses are harmful to borrowers because they considerably 
diminish the accountability of lenders.66 Lenders are much more fa-
miliar with the arbitration process than individual borrowers and, as a 
result, are prepared to take advantage of the nuances of the arbitra-
tion system.67 Borrowers are also placed at a disadvantage because 
arbitration limits the claims that borrowers may assert as compared 
with a court of law.68 Additionally, “ªne print” clauses are often 
                                                                                                                      
62 Id. (internal citations omitted). Seven thousand, ªve hundred dollars was the me-
dian net worth of African-American households in 2000. Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Ctr. for Responsible Lending, Mandatory Arbitration Harms Homeowners 1 
(2004), available at www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/ib021-Mandatory_Arbitration-1204.pdf 
[hereinafter Mandatory Arbitration]. 
65 Id. 
66 See id. 
67 Id. at 2. It has been suggested that the advantages of lenders ºow not only from the 
greater familiarity that lenders have with the process as compared with borrowers, but also 
from the inherent incentive system in the arbitration system. Martha Neil, Litigation over 
Arbitration: Courts Differ on Enforceability of Mandatory Clauses, 91 A.B.A. J. 50, 53–54 (2005). 
Over time, large businesses—such as lending institutions—that employ mandatory arbitra-
tion clauses in their contract build relationships with certain arbitrators. Id. at 54. It is no 
surprise that arbitrators who ªnd in favor of the large business will be hired again for fu-
ture arbitrations. See id. Advocates against mandatory arbitration clauses have argued that 
these circumstances compromise the impartiality of arbitrators in two ways. See id. First, the 
personal relationships that are developed between repeat customers and arbitrators may 
lead to favoritism towards the repeat customer based purely on friendship or familiarity. 
See id. Second, and perhaps even more troubling, is the incentive of arbitrators to ªnd in 
favor of repeat arbitrators, such as lending institutions, so that they will be hired in the 
future. See id. at 53–54. 
68 Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 64, at 2. Arbitration may also be cost prohibi-
tive for some indigent borrowers who wish to assert claims against lenders. Id. at 1. Though 
arbitration is often celebrated as a low-cost alternative to the traditional court system, the 
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“agreed” to without the actual knowledge of the borrower.69 Even if 
the borrower were aware of the mandatory arbitration clause, sub-
prime borrowers lack the bargaining power to negotiate around this 
clause.70 Instead, borrowers are provided with a “take it or leave it 
choice” with regard to the acceptance of the lender’s terms, which, 
arguably, is not a meaningful choice at all.71
 The common theme in the above-presented sampling of preda-
tory lending practices is that each of the practices irreversibly strips 
equity from the homes of individuals by charging unjustiªably high 
interest rates and fees or by strong-arming individuals into unfair 
terms.72 These abusive practices are troubling, especially considering 
the tremendous negative impact of predatory lending on vulnerable 
populations in the United States.73
B. Who Are the Victims of Predatory Lending in Subprime Mortgages? 
 In 2001, the Coalition for Responsible Lending (Coalition) esti-
mated that predatory lending practices cost American homeowners 
$9.1 billion each year.74 In this estimate, the Coalition included calcula-
tions for exorbitant and unnecessary fees in the form of prepayment 
penalties, single premium insurance plans, and other unjustiªably high 
                                                                                                                      
Center for Responsible Lending notes that the administrative and ªling costs of arbitration 
regularly amount to thousands of dollars. Id. This amount of money could certainly be 
prohibitive for individuals disputing their debts to lenders. See id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 See id. 
72 See infra Part I.B. 
73 See infra Part I.B. 
74 Stein, supra note 7, at 2. The Coalition for Responsible Lending is an alliance of: 
ªnancial institutions, religious organizations, community groups and others 
dedicated to protecting the home equity of all North Carolinians, estimated 
at $100 billion. The Coalition currently includes close to 120 organizations 
whose memberships total over 3 million, as well as others who have joined as 
individuals, including 120 CEOs of ªnancial institutions. A few of the largest 
member organizations include AARP-NC, NC NAACP, the NC Credit Union 
League, and the NC Council of Churches. 
Ctr. For Responsible Lending, N.C. Predatory Mortgage Lending Law: Frequently Asked 
Questions, http://www.responsiblelending.org/predlend_nc/faqs.cfm#three (last visited 
Aug. 17, 2005). The Coalition for Responsible Lending also cites the N.C. Fair Housing 
Center and the Community Reinvestment Association of N.C. as important members of 
their network. Id. This Coalition worked very hard to create and lobby for the ªrst 
signiªcant state anti-predatory lending law in North Carolina. See id. 
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up-front fees.75 The cost to borrowers who are charged unjustiªably 
high interest rates, also described as Rate-Risk Disparities, were also ac-
counted for in the Coalition’s overall estimate of the cost of predatory 
lending practices.76 This $9.1 billion ªgure provides one with an ap-
preciation of the magnitude of the predatory lending problem.77
 The harmful effect of predatory lending practices on American 
homeowners is massive, and all evidence indicates that the problem 
has been expanding over the past decade.78 In 1993, lenders origi-
nated approximately 100,000 subprime reªnance loans and home 
purchase loans.79 Just nine years later, in 2002, that number jumped 
to approximately 1.36 million subprime loans.80 Some experts in the 
lending industry suggest that statistics will show additional increases 
in subprime lending over the course of 2004.81
 An estimated 65% of subprime mortgage loans in 2002 were 
reªnances of already existing loans.82 The advocacy group, Association 
of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), notes that 
subprime reªnance loans are of particular concern because often 
homeowners with “signiªcant amounts of equity are convinced to 
reªnance under conditions that leave them considerably worse off than 
they were before.”83 Between 1993 and 2002, subprime reªnance lend-
ing skyrocketed, increasing 1,070.8% over the nine year period, com-
pared with a relatively modest increase of 55.6% in prime 
reªnancing.84
                                                                                                                      
75 Stein, supra note 7, at 2. The Coalition for Responsible Lending estimates that pre-
payment penalties cost approximately 850,000 families $2.3 billion annually, while single 
premium insurance plans are thought to cost approximately 500,000 families $2.1 billion 
annually, and other unjustiªably high up-front fees are thought to cost 750,000 families 
$1.8 billion annually. Id. at 3. 
76 Id. The Coalition suggests that excessively high interest rates on mortgage loans 
costs approximately 600,000 families $2.9 billion each year. Id. 
77 See id. at 13. Eric Stein, the author of this quantitative analysis of the economic im-
pact of certain predatory lending practices, acknowledges in the report that the calcula-
tions are “rough, though conservative, estimates.” Id. Although admitting the difªculty in 
pinpointing speciªc dollar amounts with precision, Stein asserts that the numbers “provide 
an order of magnitude of the amount of equity stripped, each year, from those least able to 
afford it.” Id. 
78 ACORN, supra note 15, at 6. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 12. 
83 ACORN, supra note 15, at 12. 
84 Id. at 13–14. 
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 The greater Boston area, in particular, has seen dramatic in-
creases in subprime reªnance lending.85 Subprime reªnance lending 
was almost ªfteen times greater in 2002 than it was in 1994 in the 
greater Boston area, increasing from 140 loans to 2,065 loans.86 The 
most recent statistics from the Boston area indicate a continuing up-
ward trend as subprime reªnance loans increased from 1,654 loans in 
2001 to 2,065 loans in 2002, an astonishing 24.8% increase in this type 
of lending over the course of one year.87
 The cost of predatory lending practices is extremely high and con-
tinually increasing.88 Unfortunately, American homeowners do not 
share this immense burden equally.89 Predatory lending disproportion-
ately affects some of the most vulnerable members of our society includ-
ing minorities and their communities, those in low-income neighbor-
hoods, and the elderly.90
                                                                                                                      
85 Jim Campen, Borrowing Trouble? IV: Subprime Mortgage Reªnance Lending in 
Greater Boston 2000–2002, at 3 (2004), available at http://www.mahahome.org/docu 
ments/BorrowingTrouble4.pdf. These statistics only apply to subprime reªnance loans and 
not to subprime home purchase loans. Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. The ever-increasing amount of subprime lending in the Boston area, may be par-
tially due to the existence of exceptionally high rental rates for Boston apartments. See 
Johnny Diaz, City Weekly Census Insights: Housing Costs as Percent of Income, Boston Globe, 
Jan. 26, 2003, at City Weekly 1. “Fearing being priced out as a renter, [Boston residents] 
overextend themselves into home ownership, often falling prey to ‘predatory lending,’ 
high-pressure sales tactics by lenders who target minority, elderly, and low-income borrow-
ers for loans with high interest rates and fees.” Id. These borrowers sacriªce a great deal to 
pay for these largely subprime loans. See id. For example, in the Boston neighborhoods of 
Mission Hill and Grove Hall, homeowners spend an average of 49% of their income on 
costs related to homeowning. Id. Other parts of Boston and neighboring areas withstand 
average ownership costs between 40% and 62%. Id. Boston residents accept these uncon-
scionably high cost loans—that often require nearly half of their income—because they 
are desperate to avoid skyrocketing rental prices. See id. As Christine Jones, a Boston area 
nurse who spends 58% of her income on her condo, stated, “I didn’t want to be at the 
mercy of rents . . . [l]ooking for an apartment was never even an option.” Id. 
88 See ACORN, supra note 15, at 6; Stein, supra note 7, at 2. 
89 Drained Wealth, supra note 29, at 6. 
90 Id. The Center for Responsible Lending has described the elderly (those aged 70 or 
above) as the “main targets” of predatory lending. Ctr. for Responsible Lending, The 
Case for Predatory Lending Reform 2 (2002), available at http://www.responsiblelend 
ing.org/pdfs/pp-Case_for_PL_Reform-1002.pdf. The elderly often own their homes “free 
and clear of any mortgage debt,” thus giving them a great deal of equity. Id. (noting that in 
the United States, “approximately 663,000 elderly homeowners have lived in their homes 
for over 20 years; own these homes free and clear of debt; have incomes of less than 
$30,000; and have equity of $100,000 or more”). Despite the fact that many elderly are 
“asset rich,” many elderly are “cash-poor” and live on a ªxed-income. Id. Unexpected 
medical or other costs leave this population vulnerable to unscrupulous lenders. Id. The 
problem is compounded by the fact that elderly homeowners are often under-informed 
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 The disproportionate impact of predatory lending on minorities is 
well documented.91 In 2002, African-American borrowers were 3.6 
times more likely than white borrowers to receive subprime home pur-
chase loans; Latino borrowers were 2.5 times more likely than white 
borrowers.92 Additionally, it is estimated that borrowers in predomi-
nantly African-American neighborhoods are “ªve times more likely to 
be subject to wealth-stripping prepayment penalties than borrowers in 
white neighborhoods.”93
 Similarly, in the greater Boston area, a disproportionate number of 
subprime reªnance loans were made to minorities.94 In 2002, African-
American borrowers in the reªnance market were 5.4 times more likely 
to receive a subprime loan than white borrowers; Latino borrowers 
were 3.4 times more likely to receive one than white borrowers.95
 The racial disparity cannot be explained by differences in the 
average incomes of racial groups, as the disparity also exists among 
borrowers of the same income level.96 In 2002, upper-income African-
American home purchase borrowers were 2.8 times more likely than 
upper-income white home purchase borrowers to receive a subprime 
loan.97 Similarly, upper-income Latinos were 2.8 times more likely to 
receive a subprime loan when purchasing a home than were upper-
                                                                                                                      
about ªnancial options. Id. One ex-employee of a subprime lender stated that the “perfect 
customer” is “an uneducated widow who is on a ªxed income—hopefully from her de-
ceased husband’s pension and social security—who has her house paid off, is living off of 
her credit cards, but having a difªcult time making payments, and who must make a car 
payment in addition to her credit card payments.” Id. 
91 ACORN, supra note 15, at 35. 
92 Id. The disparities between borrowers of different racial classiªcations have been in-
creasing with the increase in the number of subprime loans over the past decade. Id. The 
disparities were considerably lower in 1997 when African-Americans were 2.9 times more 
likely to receive a subprime home purchase loan (compared with 3.6 times in 2002) and 
Latinos were 2 times more likely than whites to receive such a loan (compared with 2.5 
times in 2002). Id. The disparities are even more pronounced in certain metropolitan 
areas. Id. at 45. “African-Americans in Milwaukee were nearly nine times more likely than 
whites to receive a subprime loan when buying a house with a conventional loan and in 
Chicago were over seven times more likely.” Id. at 45. 
93 Stein, supra note 7, at 8; see supra Part I.A. for a discussion of prepayment penalties. 
94 Campen, supra note 85, at 3. 
95 Id. In 2002, David Swanson, a spokesperson for ACORN, noted that the extreme ra-
cial disparities that existed in subprime lending in Boston could be attributable to reasons 
such as “sub-prime lenders’ aggressive marketing efforts in minority neighborhoods and 
an inadequate commitment from mainstream lenders—namely traditional banks—to offer 
loans to residents of those places.” Jon Chesto, Minorities Hit with Higher Interest; Report: 
Predatory Lenders Take Advantage, Boston Herald, Nov. 27, 2002, at 34. 
96 ACORN, supra note 15, at 37–38. 
97 Id. at 37. 
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income white borrowers.98 Shocking disparities are also present in the 
middle, moderate, and low-income comparisons of the likelihood of 
receiving a subprime home purchase loan.99 Racial disparities among 
borrowers within the same income level are also found in the sub-
prime reªnance market.100
 The racial disparity in subprime lending may be a result of fun-
damental racial discrimination in the lending decision process.101 The 
Urban Institute prepared a report for the U.S. Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development (HUD) that concluded that minorities 
“face discrimination from mortgage lenders” in a variety of ways.102 
Through “paired testing” experiments, the Urban Institute found that 
minorities were “less likely to receive information about loan prod-
ucts, received less time and information from loan ofªcers, and were 
quoted higher interest rates.”103 The discriminatory treatment of mi-
nority borrowers in the loan application process partially explains the 
racial disparity in subprime lending.104
                                                                                                                      
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
Middle-income African-Americans were 3.7 times more likely to receive a sub-
prime [home purchase] loan than middle-income whites while middle-income 
Latinos were 2.9 times more likely. Moderate-income African-Americans were 
3.7 times more likely to receive a subprime [home purchase] loan than moder-
ate-income whites while moderate-income Latinos were 2.1 times more likely 
than moderate-income whites. Low-income African-Americas [sic] were 3.9 
[times] more likely to receive a subprime home purchase loan than low-income 
whites while low-income Latinos were 1.4 times more likely. 
Id. 
100 Id. at 21–22. In the home mortgage reªnance market, “[u]pper-income African-
American homeowners were 2.1 times more likely than upper-income white homeowners 
to receive a subprime reªnance loan in 2002. Upper-income Latinos were 1.3 times more 
likely to receive a subprime loan than upper-income whites.” Id. at 22. Middle-income Afri-
can-American reªnance borrowers “were 3.7 times more likely than middle-income whites 
to receive a subprime reªnance loan while middle-income Latinos were 2.6 times more 
likely than middle-income whites [to receive a subprime loan].” Id. “Moderate-income 
African-Americans were 3.4 times more likely to receive a subprime reªnance loan than 
moderate-income whites while moderate-income Latinos were 2.1 times more likely to 
receive a subprime reªnance loan than moderate-income whites.” Id. Similarly, “[l]ow-
income African-Americans were 3.4 times more likely to receive a subprime reªnance loan 
than low-income whites while low-income Latinos were 1.8 times more likely to receive a 
subprime loan than low-income whites.” Id. 
101 Drained Wealth, supra note 29, at 30. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. Paired testing experiments are experiments that use a control group. 
104 See id. 
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 In addition to minority groups, low and moderate-income home 
mortgage borrowers also receive a disproportionately large number of 
subprime loans.105 “[R]esidents of low and moderate income neighbor-
hoods were at least two times more likely to be turned down for a [con-
ventional, prime] loan than residents of upper-income neighbor-
hoods.”106 When minority and low-income individuals are rejected by 
the traditional lending industry that offers prime loans, they are forced 
to seek subprime loans from “shadow banks” such as check-cashing 
stores, pawnshops, and payday lenders.107 In the greater Boston area in 
2002, 9.6% of reªnance loans made to low-income borrowers were 
from subprime lenders and 9.0% of the loans made to moderate-
income borrowers were from subprime lenders.108 Comparatively, 7.2% 
of reªnance loans to middle-income borrowers were from subprime 
lenders.109 Only 4.1% of loans to upper-income borrowers were from 
subprime lenders.110
 The increasing burden of predatory lending on minority and 
low-income groups is not surprising considering the recent trend of 
banks exiting minority and low-income neighborhoods.111 Studies in-
dicate that the proximity of a conventional bank’s branches to pre-
dominantly low and moderate-income neighborhoods affects the 
amount of lending that the conventional bank conducts in those ar-
eas.112 Meanwhile, Federal Reserve economists have noted that “the 
number of banking ofªces in low and moderate-income areas de-
creased 21% from 1975 to 1995, while the total number of banks in all 
areas rose 29% during this same period.”113 Though traditional banks 
have steadily abandoned these areas, people living in minority and 
low or moderate-income neighborhoods continue to require ªnancial 
services.114 Potential borrowers in these areas are left without the in-
formation that accompanies a traditional banking relationship and 
are, as a result, often easy targets for the aggressive and deceptive 
                                                                                                                      
105 Campen, supra note 85, at 6. 
106 ACORN, supra note 15, at 45. 
107 Id. at 46. Interestingly, the “shadow banks” are often funded by, otherwise reputa-
ble, mainstream lenders. Id. For example, Wells Fargo “has arranged more than $700 mil-
lion in loans since 1998 to three of the largest check cashers: Ace Cash Express, EZ Corp., 
and Cash America.” Id. 
108 Campen, supra note 85, at 6. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 ACORN, supra note 15, at 45. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 See id. 
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marketing techniques of predatory lenders.115 This partially explains 
the concentration of predatory lending in minority and low or mod-
erate-income neighborhoods.116
 The concentration of subprime loans and predatory lending 
practices in speciªc neighborhoods can have a devastating impact on 
the well being of those neighborhoods as a whole.117 This is primarily 
because subprime loans are associated with excessively high foreclo-
sure rates that are thought to be a result of predatory terms.118 A Joint 
HUD/Treasury study reported that during a 20-month period, “sub-
prime foreclosure rates averaged 2.6% compared to 0.62% for prime 
mortgages.”119 The increased likelihood of foreclosure combined with 
the concentration of subprime lending can lead to boarded-up homes 
that carry resounding social costs for entire communities.120 As af-
fordable housing advocate Eric Stein notes: 
The value of surrounding homes, and therefore the equity 
held by neighboring homeowners, drops as a result of high 
rates of foreclosure. Crime increases in high-vacancy areas, 
imposing economic costs. Communities with excessive fore-
closure rates face a host of other costs, including lost reve-
nues associated with difªculty [in] attracting investments.121
The crippling impact of predatory lending on individual borrowers, 
their families, and their neighborhoods is what has driven federal and 
state legislators to the drafting board to consider the best means for 
preventing, or at least minimizing, harm to future borrowers. 
II. The Backdrop: Homeownership Equity Protection Act and 
the Anti-Predatory Movement 
 In recognition of the devastation caused by predatory lending in 
the subprime mortgage market, the federal government undertook 
the ªrst major legislative reform effort in 1994 through the Home-
                                                                                                                      
115 Id. at 46. 
116 See ACORN, supra note 15, at 46. 
117 Stein, supra note 7, at 12 (noting the cumulative impact of predatory lending on 
neighborhoods). 
118 Id. at 11. Though one should reasonably expect higher foreclosure risks in this 
generally higher credit risk category of loans, the foreclosure rate is greater than it should 
be even accounting for this increased risk, and this difference has been attributed to 
predatory characteristics of the subprime loans. Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 12. 
121 Id. 
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ownership Equity Protection Act (HOEPA).122 This federal effort was 
followed by supplementary protections through state laws starting 
with North Carolina’s Predatory Lending Law (NCPLL) in 1999.123 
Since 1999, approximately thirty states have followed suit by enacting 
variations of NCPLL.124 The extent to which state predatory lending 
laws are preempted by federal laws and regulations has been hotly 
debated.125 The debate revolves around lofty questions of federalism, 
practical concerns regarding whether federal or state governments 
are better able to regulate and enforce predatory lending protections, 
and the inevitable power struggles that stem from conºicts between 
protecting consumers and protecting cash ºow from national bank 
lobbies.126 This section seeks to present the basic structure of the fed-
eral and state laws and regulations in addition to the conºicts among 
these authorities. 
A. Homeownership Equity Protection Act 
 Congress enacted HOEPA in 1994 as an amendment to the Truth 
in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1691.127 The primary purpose of 
HOEPA was to address the problem of ‘reverse redlining.’128 Reverse 
redlining is the practice of targeting residents “within certain geo-
graphic boundaries, often based on income, race, or ethnicity,” and 
giving those targeted borrowers “credit on unfair terms.”129 
                                                                                                                      
122 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602(aa), 1610, 1639, 1640 (2005); Siddhartha Venkatesan, Note, Ab-
rogating the Holder in Due Course Doctrine in Subprime Mortgage Transactions to More Effectively 
Police Predatory Lending, 7 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 177, 193–94 (2003) (describing 
HOEPA as the ªrst federal legislative response to predatory lending). 
123 Predatory Lending Act, 1999 N.C. Sess. Laws 332; see infra Part II.B. 
124 See infra Part II.C. 
125 See, e.g., Andrew T. Reardon, Note, An Examination of Recent Preemption Issues in Bank-
ing Law, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 347, 355–71 (2004). 
126 See id.. See generally Ctr. For Responsible Lending, Federal Preemption Favors 
Predatory Lending: States have an edge in Protecting Homeowners 1 (2004), avail-
able at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/ib010-Fed_Preemption_Favors_PL-0604. 
pdf [hereinafter Federal Preemption]; The Ofªce of the Comptroller of the Currency’s 
Rules on National Bank Preemption and Visitorial Powers: Hearing Before the Senate 
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 18–19 (2004) (testimony of 
Martin Eakes, Chief Executive Ofªcer, Center for Responsible Lending) available at 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/040704_Senate_Banking.pdf [hereinafter Eakes 
Testimony]. 
127 Barbara J. Van Arsdale, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Home 
Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, 198 A.L.R. Fed. 631 (2005). 
128 S. Rep. No. 103–169, at 21 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1881, 1905. 
129 Id. “Reverse redlining,” or the targeting of individuals in certain communities for 
credit on unfair terms, is called this because “redlining” is the term used to describe the 
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Speciªcally, HOEPA attempted to protect individuals in very low-
income areas who had built up substantial equity in their homes.130 
Congress was particularly concerned with protecting these low-
income, high-equity borrowers because giving high-cost predatory 
loans to such borrowers predictably leads to foreclosures with dra-
matic losses of equity.131 In an attempt to prevent this form of “reverse 
redlining,” HOEPA mandated new disclosure requirements and other 
consumer protections for certain types of home mortgage loans.132
 As compared with later state laws dealing with predatory lending 
in the home mortgage market, the scope of HOPEA’s consumer pro-
tections is extremely limited, which is evidenced by two key factors.133 
First, only a narrow category of mortgage loans is regulated by HO-
EPA.134 Three major types of mortgages—home purchase mortgages, 
reverse mortgages, and open-ended credit mortgages—are explicitly 
excluded from the protections granted by the Act.135 Second, within 
the limited category of mortgages within the scope of HOEPA’s pro-
                                                                                                                      
practice of “denying credit within certain geographic boundaries, often based on income, 
race, or ethnicity.” Id. 
130 Id. at 1906. 
131 See id. 
132 Id. 
133 See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1) (2005). In acknowledgement of the exceptionally lim-
ited scope of HOEPA’s protections, policy analyst Kathleen Keest noted that “[t]he 1994 
law helped a lot, but the subprime lending industry has continued to grow tremendously, 
and so have the problems of predatory mortgage lending.” Kathleen Keest, Consequences 
of the Consumer Lending Revolution, Address Before St. Louis University School of Law & 
Consumer Federation of America 4 (Dec. 8–9, 2004), available at http://www.responsi 
blelending.org/pdfs/Legislative_Framework-1204.pdf. 
134 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1). 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1) deªnes the relatively limited types 
of loans that are regulated under the terms of HOEPA. See id. 
135 Id. Senate Report No. 103–169 states that purchase loans were excluded from HO-
EPA’s consumer protections because, in their view, “the consumer [in home purchase 
mortgages] typically lacks substantial equity in the property when such transactions occur 
[and, therefore,] the consumer is not vulnerable to unscrupulous lenders.” S. Rep. No. 
103–169, at 21 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1881, 1907. However, subprime 
home purchase loans constitute a large portion of the subprime mortgage market and the 
exclusion of this type of mortgage considerably diminishes the impact that HOEPA can 
have on the predatory lending problem as a whole. See supra Part I.A. Reverse mortgages 
are mortgages for individuals who already own their homes and use the equity in their 
homes to take out loans. See AARP, Reverse Mortgages, http://www.aarp.org/money/ 
revmort/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2005) (providing a comprehensive description of typical fea-
tures of reverse mortgages). Open-end credit mortgages are deªned by HOEPA as mort-
gages “under which the creditor reasonably contemplates repeated transactions, which 
prescribes the terms of such transactions, and which provides for a ªnance charge which 
may be computed from time to time on the outstanding unpaid balance.” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1602(i). 
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tections, only truly egregious terms are regulated.136 For example, an 
otherwise qualifying mortgage is regulated only if its interest rate ex-
ceeds the Treasury’s rate of interest by more than 10%, or if the total 
points and fees, paid by the consumer at or before closing, exceed 8% 
of the total loan amount or $400, whichever is greater.137 Qualifying 
loans that exceed these guidelines for interest rates or total points 
and fees are deemed to be a mortgage that is subject to the special 
regulations of HOEPA.138
 HOEPA regulates high cost mortgages in three substantial ways.139 
First, these mortgages are subject to disclosure requirements prior to 
closing.140 These requirements mandate disclosure to the potential 
borrower that the borrower is not required to complete the loan trans-
action and that there is the possibility that they could lose their home 
through foreclosure on the loan.141 The lender must also disclose the 
annual percentage rate, the monthly payment amount, and the maxi-
mum amount to which the monthly payment could be increased over 
the course of the loan.142 If the lender fails to meet these disclosure 
requirements, the borrower has the right to cancel the loan.143
 The second way that HOEPA protects borrowers from high cost 
mortgages is by providing for a three day waiting period before the 
loan is consummated.144 This “cooling-period” is intended to reduce 
the damaging effects of high pressure sales tactics by giving potential 
borrowers the opportunity to reºect on whether the loan is accept-
                                                                                                                      
136 See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1)(A)–(B). 
137 Id. The borrower’s payments that are considered to be the “points and fees” of a 
particular loan under HOEPA are ªnance charges with minor exceptions. S. Rep. No. 103–
169, at 24. The total ªnance charge is deªned as “the sum of all charges, payable directly 
or indirectly by the person to whom the credit is extended, and imposed directly or indi-
rectly by the creditor as an incident to the extension of credit.” Id. All elements of the 
ªnance charge are included in the points and fees calculation except for interest and time-
price differentials. Id. Charges that are not considered part of the ªnance charge for other 
purposes of the Truth in Lending Act are also included in HOEPA’s points and fees total. 
Id. For example, HOEPA’s deªnition of points and fees also includes “any direct or indi-
rect compensation received by the creditor in connection with credit insurance and any 
compensation paid to mortgage brokers.” Id. The deªnition also includes “charges such as 
appraisal fees, title examination, document preparation fees, and credit report charges 
unless the charge is reasonable, paid to an unafªliated third party, and involves no direct 
or indirect compensation to the creditor.” Id. at 24–25. 
138 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa). 
139 See S. Rep. No. 103–169, at 25. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 S. Rep. No. 103–169, at 25. 
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able.145 The Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee noted 
that the period “prevents creditors from knocking on a borrower’s 
door and closing a loan on the same day.”146
 The third way in which HOEPA regulates high cost mortgages is 
through the prohibition of certain inherently misleading terms that 
disguise the actual cost of a loan.147 The following terms are prohib-
ited: “prepayment penalties, points on loan amounts reªnanced, de-
fault interest rates above the rate prior to the default, balloon pay-
ments, negative amortization, or prepayment of more than two of the 
periodic payments.”148 The prohibition on these particularly mislead-
ing and damaging terms was intended to protect borrowers from the 
addition of the most egregious terms to already high cost mort-
gages.149
 Though HOEPA’s protections are a step in the right direction, 
the deªnition of what constitutes a high cost mortgage is extremely 
under-inclusive.150 Several organizations that study predatory lending 
believe that HOEPA’s standard of regulating loans with total points 
and fees over 8% is too permissive and that loans with points and fees 
well under 8% are also abusive.151 “Fannie Mae, the [North Carolina] 
General Assembly, and Washington Mutual have all found that points 
and fees greater than 5% are abusive.”152 Additionally, the Coalition 
                                                                                                                      
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. The prohibition of these terms is not absolute. Id. Congress delegated to the 
Federal Reserve Board broad discretionary authority to “exempt speciªc mortgage prod-
ucts or categories of products from the prohibitions.” Id. The Banking, Housing, and Ur-
ban Affairs Committee was particularly concerned with the inadvertent prohibition of 
mortgage products such as reverse mortgages. Id. In addition to exempting beneªcial and 
non-abusive mortgage products from the prohibitions, the discretionary authority granted 
to the Federal Reserve Board is also intended to allow the Federal Reserve Board to 
ºexibly respond to “new products and practices [that] may emerge that facilitate reverse 
redlining” and thereby prevent attempts to evade HOEPA regulations. Id. 
148 Id. Loans with balloon payments require borrowers to make regular payments, of-
ten for between ªve or seven years, and then pay the remainder of the loan balance in one 
lump sum. ACORN, supra note 15, at 54. Balloon payments are harmful because they often 
force borrowers to reªnance their loan in order to pay the balloon payment. Id. Addition-
ally, borrowers are often not aware that their loan has a balloon payment and are unable to 
prepare for the balloon payment. See id. 
149 See S. Rep. No. 103–169, at 25–27 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1881, 
1909. 
150 See Stein, supra note 7, at 7. 
151 See id. 
152 Id. 
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For Responsible Lending believes that points and fees above 3% are 
abusive and constitute predatory lending.153
 Congress’ selection of 8%—a relatively high percentage—as the 
minimum trigger for regulation, may be due to Congress’ view of HO-
EPA’s role in the federalist banking system.154 HOEPA’s legislative his-
tory suggests that legislators intended HOEPA to serve as a baseline 
upon which states could build.155 The House Conference Report states 
that the purpose of § 152(e) of HOEPA was to clarify that the Act 
should preempt state mortgage legislation only where such legislation 
is inconsistent with the federal scheme.156 Furthermore, the Report 
states that “[t]he Conferees intend to allow states to enact more protec-
tive provisions than those in this legislation.”157 As an example, the Re-
port indicates that state bans on prepayment penalties “would remain 
in effect following enactment of this legislation.”158 Thus HOEPA’s leg-
islative history clearly expresses an intention to allow states to continue 
to both enforce prior predatory lending laws and to create new statutes 
that would build upon HOEPA’s protections.159
                                                                                                                      
153 Id. Though the Coalition believes that points and fees above 3% are abusive, in 
making their calculations about the economic costs of predatory lending they deªne 
predatory loans as those with points and fees above 5%. Id. The Coalition does this be-
cause, in their view, the general consensus is that 5% is the proper bar above which points 
and fees are predatory and require consumer protections. Id. To keep these estimations of 
what constitutes predatory points and fees in perspective, compare them with the average 
points and fees for prime home mortgage loans, which amount to only 1.1%. 
154 See H.R. Rep. No. 103–652, at 162 (1994) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1994 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1977, 1992 (describing the ability of states to enact more protective preda-
tory lending laws that those in this legislation). The United States employs a dual banking 
system. See Reardon, supra note 125, at 353. Banks and their subsidiaries have the option of 
procuring a national or state charter. See id.; supra Part II.D. 
155 See H.R. Rep. No. 103–652, at 162; see also Keest, supra note 133, at 1–2, 4 (noting 
that the consumer revolution was historically characterized by federal laws that supple-
mented, rather than supplanted state laws and that HOEPA was intended to be a mini-
mum standard). 
156 H.R. Rep. No. 103–652, at 162. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. At the time of the consideration of this legislation, the Senate Report notes that 
“[p]repayment penalties are presently prohibited in 12 states and limited in at least 10 
others.” S. Rep. No. 103–169, at 26 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1881, 1910. 
Additionally, the Senate Report uses the prevalence of prepayment prohibitions in state 
legislation as support for inclusion of restrictions on prepayment penalties within HOEPA. 
Id. This acknowledgement of state regulations of home mortgage loans, without more, 
implies that the Senate also believed that state regulations were in harmony with HOEPA, 
and that no preemption was necessary. See id. 
159 See H.R. Rep. No. 103–652, at 162. 
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B. State Legislation: The North Carolina Example 
 In 1999, ªve years after HOEPA was enacted, North Carolina be-
came the ªrst state to enact a comprehensive predatory lending 
law.160 North Carolina’s Predatory Lending Law (NCPLL) is more 
protective than HOEPA in several respects.161 First, and perhaps most 
importantly, NCPLL’s deªnition of a high cost mortgage is more in-
clusive than HOEPA.162 Whereas HOEPA prohibits certain especially 
abusive terms when a mortgage’s points and fees exceed 8% of the 
total amount of the loan, NCPLL prohibits similar terms when the 
points and fees exceed 5% of the total amount of the loan.163 
NCPLL’s determination that home mortgages with points and fees 
above 5% are abusive is consistent with prevailing views of reputable 
lenders, government agencies, and consumer watch groups.164 Sec-
ond, NCPLL contains a blanket prohibition on the ªnancing of sin-
gle-premium insurance policies regardless of whether the home 
mortgage qualiªes as a highcost mortgage under the Act.165 Finally, 
NCPLL also has a blanket prohibition against prepayment penalties 
for home mortgage loans of $150,000 or less.166
 As the ªrst state law of its kind, this law attracted a great deal of 
scrutiny and its degree of success was analyzed in at least six major stud-
ies.167 Critics of state anti-predatory lending laws reported concerns 
                                                                                                                      
160 Predatory Lending Act, 1999 N.C. Sess. Laws 332; Robert G. Quercia, Michael A. 
Stegman & Walter R. Davis, Assessing the Impact of North Carolina’s Predatory Lending Law, 15 
Housing Pol’y Debate 573, 577 (2004) available at http://www.fanniemaefoundation. 
org/programs/hpd/pdf/hpd_1503_Quercia.pdf [hereinafter Quercia]. 
161 See Quercia, supra note 160, at 597–98. 
162 See id. 
163 See id. at 597. NCPLL prohibits “the ªnancing of fees, balloon payments, negative 
amortization, and lending without regard to a homeowner’s ability to repay” for high-cost 
home loans. Id. In addition to prohibiting these terms in loans with points and fees ex-
ceeding 5% of the total amount of the loan, NCPLL also prohibits these terms for mort-
gage loans that have annual interest rates that are in violation of HOEPA (currently 8%). 
Id. Therefore, while NCPLL is more protective in terms of regulating loans with high 
points and fees, NC legislators chose to implement the same level of restrictions with re-
gard to annual interest rates as the existing federal law. See id. 
164 See supra Part II.A. 
165 Quercia, supra note 160, at 597. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 577; Keith Ernst, John Farris & Eric Stein, Ctr. for Responsible Lending, 
North Carolina’s Subprime Home Loan Market after Predatory Lending Reform 
(2002), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/ (search for “Eric Stein,” then follow 
hyperlink to the article); Morgan Stanley, Channel Check: Surprisingly Strong Sub-
prime Growth, (2002), available at http://www.butera-andrews.com/legislative-updates/ 
directory/Media/other/MS-SubPrime.pdf; Keith D. Harvey & Peter J. Nigro, Do Predatory 
Lending Laws Inºuence Mortgage Lending? An Analysis of the North Carolina Predatory Lending 
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that state efforts to stop abusive practices would scare subprime lenders 
away.168 They cautioned that the laws would have the unintended effect 
of signiªcantly reducing the number of non-abusive, beneªcial sub-
prime loans.169 This is a signiªcant concern since many non-abusive 
subprime home mortgages provide those with imperfect credit a sec-
ond chance.170 Consequently, the determination of whether state 
predatory lending laws, such as NCPLL, drive subprime lenders and 
their beneªcial services away is a critical and ongoing debate.171
 Despite these legitimate concerns, there is evidence that NCPLL 
achieved its purpose of reducing predatory lending without decreas-
ing the availability of subprime loans.172 After NCPLL was fully im-
plemented, studies indicated that there was a decline in the total 
number of subprime loan originations.173 In a study conducted at the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, researchers found that 
North Carolina experienced a “3 percent decline in overall subprime 
loan originations in the seven quarters immediately following full im-
plementation of the predatory lending law, versus the preceding 
seven quarters.”174 This overall decline does not mean that the avail-
ability of non-predatory subprime loans decreased. 
 Although there was an overall decline in subprime lending, this 
trend was only found in subprime reªnance lending and not in home 
purchase subprime lending.175 Subprime reªnance lending dropped 
by 20% after the full implementation of NCPLL,176 while subprime 
                                                                                                                      
Law, 29 J. Real Est. Fin. & Econ. 435 (2004); Gregory Ellihausen & Michael E. Staten, The 
Regulation of Subprime Mortgage Products: An Analysis of North Carolina’s Predatory Lending Law 
(Nov. 2002) (Georgetown University, McDonough School of Business, Credit Research Cen-
ter, Working Paper No. 66), available at http://www.msb.edu/prog/crc/pdf/RevisedWP66. 
pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2005) [hereinafter Ellihausen & Staten]. 
168 See Quercia, supra note 160, at 575; See Ellihausen & Staten, supra note 167, at 2–3. 
169 See Quercia, supra note 160, at 575; See Ellihausen & Staten, supra note 167, at 2–3. 
170 See Quercia, supra note 160, at 575. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 593. 
173 Id. at 586. 
174 Id. North Carolina’s 3% decline is notable when compared with the increases in 
subprime lending that occurred in other states and regions. Id. During the same time pe-
riod, there was a 17% increase in subprime loan originations. Id. Similarly, there was an 
18% increase in subprime lending in the rest of the South. Id. States bordering North 
Carolina also experienced increases in subprime lending that ranged between 3% and 
25%. Id. 
175 Quercia, supra note 160, at 587. 
176 Id. In comparison to the 20% decline in reªnance lending in North Carolina, 
“most comparison states experienced more modest losses or small gains.” Id. 
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home purchase lending experienced 72% growth.177 The University 
of North Carolina researchers concluded that the post-law decline in 
reªnance loans paired with a healthy growth in home purchase loans 
is indicative of NCPLL’s success. The researchers noted that: “[s]ince 
most abusive subprime lending involves reªnancing existing loans, we 
would expect a good law to result in a decline in home reªnancing 
loans generally and in predatory reªnancing loans in particular.”178
 Furthermore, NCPLL does not appear to have diminished access 
to subprime loans for those who need it the most—high-risk borrow-
ers.179 The University of North Carolina researchers deªned “high-
risk borrowers” as borrowers who have a credit score below 580.180 
They determined that NCPLL did not diminish the accessibility of 
subprime loans to these high-risk borrowers and concluded that “an 
equal or greater share of subprime lending for both home purchase 
and reªnancing loans went to the most credit-impaired borrowers af-
ter NCPLL rather than before.”181
 Other studies have deªned “high-risk borrowers” as low-income 
borrowers and have had mixed results.182 One study conducted by 
Elliehausen and Staten found that there was a decrease in subprime 
loans made to North Carolina borrowers who had annual incomes of 
$50,000 or less.183 In contrast, a study by Ernst, Farris, and Stein con-
cluded that NCPLL had not diminished low-income borrower’s access 
to subprime loans.184 Similarly, a study by Harvey and Nigro deter-
mined that NCPLL did not have a disparate adverse impact on North 
Carolina borrowers with incomes of $25,000 or less, and that prime 
                                                                                                                      
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 588; see supra Part I.A. (noting that subprime reªnance loans are recognized 
as the form of loan that most frequently has predatory terms). 
179 Quercia, supra note 160, at 588–89. 
180 See id. at 588. 
181 Id. at 589. Home purchase loans made to North Carolina borrowers with a credit 
score of less than 580 increased 148.8% after the full implementation of NCPLL. Id. at 
588–589. In comparison, nationally such loans increased by only 62.2%, and in the South 
there was a 59.2% increase. Id. Reªnance loans made to North Carolina borrowers with a 
credit score of less than 580 showed more modest growth of 18.5% and lagged behind 
both the national increase of 40.7% and the 35.9% increase for the rest of the South. Id. at 
588–90. Nonetheless, the University of North Carolina study concluded that high-risk bor-
rowers’ reªnance loan access had not been stiºed by NCPLL because the 18.5% increase, 
though modest, was commensurate with the trends in neighboring Tennessee and South 
Carolina, which had increases of 17.6% and 24.3% respectively. Id. 
182 Id. at 588. 
183 Id. 
184 Quercia, supra note 160, at 588. 
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and subprime loans to these borrowers had actually increased.185 With 
the exception of the Ellihausen and Staten study, all research indi-
cates that access to subprime loans was not diminished by the enact-
ment of NCPLL. 
 A second major concern with state predatory lending laws was 
that they would increase the costs of lending for all borrowers.186 A 
study conducted in 2002 suggested that NCPLL triggered higher in-
terest rates by diminishing the supply of mortgage credit in North 
Carolina.187 However, it is unclear from the available data whether 
increases in North Carolina’s interest rates were causally related to, or 
even correlated with, the implementation of NCPLL.188 Researchers 
at the University of North Carolina noted that if it were true that 
NCPLL had caused interest rates to increase by decreasing supply, 
one should expect to ªnd that North Carolina’s interest rates in-
creased at a higher rate than nearby states and the nation as a 
whole.189 Yet, an analysis of the relative increases in interest rates 
demonstrates that North Carolina did not experience unusual in-
creases after the implementation of NCPLL as, in fact, increases in 
the rest of the United States were greater.190 Consequently, there is no 
reliable evidence that interest rates rose as a result of the implementa-
tion of the NCPLL.191
 NCPLL has not had the unintended negative impact that critics 
feared, and early evidence indicates that NCPLL has succeeded in 
                                                                                                                      
185 Id. at 579, 588. The Harvey and Nigro study also found that the share of prime and 
subprime loans to minority borrowers in North Carolina had increased. Id. at 579. 
186 Id. at 590 (citing a study conducted by Elliehausen and Staten that concluded that 
NCPLL caused overall interest rates to rise by diminishing the supply of mortgage credit). 
187 Id. 
188 See id. at 590–91. 
189 Quercia, supra note 160, at 590–91. 
190 Id. at 591. Researchers at the University of North Carolina studied the changes in 
interest rates relative to other states and regions by comparing the “changes in mean in-
terest rates at origination for owner-occupied homes.” Id. The mean interest rates from the 
ªrst quarter of 1998 through the third quarter of 1999 were compared with the mean in-
terest rates between the third quarter of 2000 through the ªrst quarter of 2002. Id. North 
Carolina experienced an increase of 21.7 basis points after NCPLL was implemented. Id. 
The United States experienced an increase of 31.7 basis points and the rest of the South 
experienced an increase of 28.3 basis points. Id. 
191 See id. This ªnding that interest rates did not increase as a result of the implementa-
tion of NCPLL is consistent with the ªndings of a study conducted by a 2001 study by the 
trade publication B & C Lending. See id. at 577. This study analyzed the range of products 
and prices offered by top subprime lenders in North Carolina after NCPLL was imple-
mented. Id. “The review found that subprime lenders there were continuing to offer a full 
array of products and that there was little or no variation in the rates charged.” Id. 
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dramatically diminishing predatory lending abuses in North Caro-
lina.192 After the full implementation of NCPLL, the number of 
reªnancing loans with prepayment penalty terms of three years or 
more fell by 74.7% in North Carolina while increasing throughout the 
rest of the United States.193 Additionally, the number of reªnancing 
loans with balloon payments fell by 54.2% in North Carolina while 
declining only 12.1% in the rest of the country and 23.3% in the rest 
of the South.194 Likewise, reªnance loans with a high loan-to-value 
(LTV) ratio, which are often considered predatory, decreased relative 
to the rest of the country and region.195 Furthermore, the number of 
reªnancing loans with one or more predatory terms, declined by 
52.7% in North Carolina while increasing by 20.9% in the rest of the 
United States and 19.4% in the rest of the South.196 Perhaps most in-
dicative of the success of NCPLL in reducing predatory lending is the 
fact that out of the total decline in subprime reªnancing loans by 
3,976 loans, it is estimated that 3,541 of these loans would have had at 
least one commonly predatory term.197 Thus, “almost 90% of the de-
                                                                                                                      
192 Id. at 596. 
193 Id. at 593–94. In contrast with the decline in prepayment terms in North Carolina 
after NCPLL, the frequency of such terms increased by 30.3% in the rest of the United 
States. Id. Similarly, there was an increase of 27.5% in the rest of the South. Id. States 
neighboring North Carolina also saw considerable increases in the presence of these pre-
payment terms. Id. In South Carolina, the presence of these terms saw a 270.7% increase 
during the relevant period. Quercia, supra note 160, at 593–94. Virginia witnessed a simi-
larly alarming increase of 74.8%. Id. at 594. 
194 Quercia, supra note 160, at 594. It is not certain that the decline in balloon pay-
ment terms in North Carolina was due to the implementation of NCPLL because neigh-
boring states experienced decreases similar to North Carolina with the exception of Geor-
gia, which experienced the more moderate decrease of 23.8%. Id. In South Carolina, the 
presence of such terms decreased by an even greater 66.6%; Virginia showed a decline of 
48.5%; and Tennessee decreased by 53.7%. Id. Consequently, there may be a common 
regional cause of the decline in balloon payment terms, such as a decrease in demand, 
and NCPLL may not have caused the decrease. See id. 
195 Id. at 594–95. Reªnancing loans with an LTV of over 100% are loans in which the 
loan amount is greater than the worth of the house securing the loan. ACORN, supra note 
15, at 50. This type of loan is predatory because “[e]ven borrowers with excellent credit 
have no way to escape from a high rate loan if they are ‘upside down’ and owe more than 
their home is worth.” Id. Reªnancing loans with a combined LTV of 110% or more de-
creased by 34.4% in North Carolina after the implementation of NCPLL while increasing 
by 2.7% in the United States. Quercia, supra note 160, at 594–95. This type of loan gained 
even more ground in the rest of the South, increasing by 21.4%. Id. Thus, in the regional 
context, the decline in North Carolina is even more signiªcant. See id. 
196 Id. at 595–96. The predatory terms considered in calculating this statistic are: a 
prepayment penalty of three or more years, a balloon payment, or a combined LTV of 
110% or more. Id. 
197 Id. at 595. 
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cline in reªnancing loans . . . in the postlaw period can be attributed 
to the decline in predatory loans.”198 NCPLL dramatically decreased 
predatory lending practices in North Carolina, saving thousands from 
the damaging effects of predatory loans.199
C. Other States Follow Suit 
 Following North Carolina, many states enacted their own versions 
of predatory lending laws.200 In 2003 alone, sixteen states enacted some 
form of predatory lending legislation.201 Most of the laws recognize, to 
some degree, the potentially abusive nature of terms such as “excessive 
points and fees, balloon payments, lengthy prepayment penalties, loan 
ºipping, [and] single-premium life insurance policies.”202 The extent 
of protections provided, however, vary tremendously among state 
laws.203 For example, approximately eleven states have enacted preda-
tory lending laws that, although constructive for their recognition of 
predatory lending harms, are very similar to existing federal law or in-
dustry-promoted bills.204 Consequently, these laws offer “no meaningful 
new protections for consumers.”205 In contrast, eleven other states have 
enacted legislation that is characterized as “moderate to strong:” Ar-
kansas, California, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, and West Vir-
ginia.206 The latter eleven states’ capacity to diminish predatory lending 
harms through strong legislation has been limited, however, by recent 
preemptive actions of one federal bank regulatory agency, the Ofªcer 
of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).207
D. Ofªcer of Comptroller of the Currency Regulations Diminish the 
Effectiveness of State Anti-Predatory Lending Legislation 
 On January 13, 2004, the OCC issued ªnal rules fully preempting 
states from regulating national banks and their subsidiaries under state 
                                                                                                                      
198 Id. 
199 See id. 
200 Quercia, supra note 160, at 576, 577 n.4. 
201 Id. at 576–77. 
202 Id. at 576; see infra Part III. for a discussion of loan “ºipping.” 
203 Quercia, supra note 160, at 576–77. 
204 Id. at 576–577 n.4. 
205 Id. 
206 Id.; see infra Part III. (describing Massachusetts’ predatory lending law as having 
strong protections relative to other federal and state protections). 
207 See infra Part II.D. 
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anti-predatory lending laws.208 These rules became effective on Febru-
ary 12, 2004.209 As a result, state anti-predatory lending laws apply only 
to banks that were created through state bank charters and not to those 
that were created through a national charter or are subsidiaries of na-
tionally chartered banks.210 The OCC’s recent preemptive actions have 
been widely criticized, both as an unlawful power-grab by the OCC, and 
for the harmful effects on borrowers who would otherwise be protected 
by strong state anti-predatory lending laws.211
 The power of the OCC to broadly preempt states from regulating 
nationally chartered banks has been challenged in several recent 
cases.212 In this line of cases, courts have consistently held that the 
OCC does have broad preemption powers.213 A prominent example 
of the judiciary’s expansive reading of the OCC’s preemption power is 
found in Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Boutris.214 In this case, Wells Fargo 
Bank sued the Commissioner of the California Department of Corpo-
ration for attempting to enforce California laws against the national 
bank and its subsidiaries.215 The Commissioner, while conceding that 
the OCC had exclusive visitorial power over the national bank, argued 
that the OCC did not reserve the exclusive power to regulate the sub-
sidiaries of national banks.216 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
                                                                                                                      
208 Reardon, supra note 125, at 371. The ªnal rules evolved from two proposed rules. 
See id. at 369. The OCC proposed the ªrst rule on February 7, 2003. Id. This rule stated 
that the OCC, as opposed to states, had the exclusive visitorial power over national banks 
and their subsidiaries. Id. The rule also stated that even if a state provision applied to a 
national bank, the OCC would maintain oversight over such regulation. Id. The second 
relevant rule was proposed by the OCC on August 5, 2003 and it was in this proposal that 
the OCC asserted blanket federal preemption over the regulation of national banks and 
their subsidiary companies. Id. at 371. 
209 Id. at 372. 
210 See id. at 349–50. This preemptive action by the OCC provides banks and other 
nontraditional lending institutions with a great deal of ºexibility. Id. at 349. Banks are able 
to choose the forum from which they receive their charters and are, consequently, able to 
choose the regulations under which they operate. Id. Under this preemptive rule, banks 
that wish to avoid the stricter state predatory lending laws can simply choose to be a na-
tionally chartered institution. See id. 
211 See, e.g., Federal Preemption, supra note 126, at 1–2. 
212 Reardon, supra note 125, at 349; see, e.g., Jessup v. Pulaski, 327 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 
2003); Bank of Am. v. City & County of San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551 (9th Cir. 2002); Wells 
Fargo Bank v. Boutris, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1162 (E.D. Cal. 2003). 
213 Reardon, supra note 125, at 361–68 (discussing recent decisions which hold that the 
OCC has expansive preemption powers at length). 
214 See generally Wells Fargo Bank, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 1162; Reardon, supra note 125, at 
367. 
215 Wells Fargo Bank, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 1163–64. 
216 Id. at 1165. 
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District of California rejected the Commissioner’s argument, holding 
that states are preempted from regulating, not only national banks, 
but also their subsidiaries.217
 Even if the OCC’s preemptive actions are legitimate, many critics 
have argued that the OCC’s decision to exercise such power will leave 
borrowers more vulnerable to the harms associated with predatory 
lending.218 The Center for Responsible Lending (CRL) argues that 
federal preemption is both unnecessary and harmful to borrowers 
because states regulate predatory lenders more effectively.219 CRL as-
serts that federal law is ineffective because “[t]he federal government 
is far removed from the day-to-day market and slow to respond to 
changes.”220 Consequently, predatory lenders can ªnd loopholes, or 
new scams, that go long undetected by the slow-moving federal gov-
ernment.221 In contrast, CRL argues, states are better equipped to 
identify and respond to new scams.222 State legislatures are able to 
understand the unique characteristics—and abuses—of local real es-
tate markets.223 A better appreciation of these markets allows states to 
create ºexible protections for communities targeted by predatory 
lenders.224 Finally, CRL argues that there is no need for the federal 
agencies to take the reins through preemption because state protec-
tions, such as NCPLL, have been effective in dealing with predatory 
lending abuses.225
 Meanwhile, supporters of federal preemption argue that the pro-
liferation of state laws makes it extremely difªcult for national banks 
to be aware of and comply with all of the varying laws and regulatory 
schemes.226 Further, they argue that this inefªciency increases costs to 
                                                                                                                      
217 Id. at 1171. This result was afªrmed by the ninth circuit. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. 
Boutris, 419 F.3d 949, 954 (6th Cir. 2005). 
218 See generally Federal Preemption, supra note 126. 
219 Id. at 1. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 Federal Preemption, supra note 126, at 2 (noting that “land values, foreclosure 
rates and the prevalence of prepayment penalties all vary widely”). 
224 Id. As an example of a community that requires special attention, beyond what is 
available from federal protections, the Center for Responsible Lending notes that “in 
Pennsylvania’s rural Monroe County, more than one in ªve of all mortgaged homes are 
involved in foreclosure proceedings.” Id. 
225 Id. at 1. 
226 Ass’n of Comty. Organizers for Reform Now, State Anti-Predatory Lending Laws: More Harm 
Than Help, Aug. 22, 2003, http://www.acorn.org/index.php?id=8313&tx_ttnews [pointer] 
=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=9004&tx_ttnews[backPid]=2777&cHash=ba487865bc (last visited 
Nov. 26, 2005) [hereinafter State Anti-Predatory Lending Laws]. 
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borrowers.227 Speciªcally, if a multitude of state laws increases the 
costs of national bank chains, those costs will be passed onto subprime 
borrowers.228 Preemption would create a uniform regulatory scheme 
that supporters contend is more efªcient and cost effective, and thus 
in keeping with the interests of national banks and borrowers.229
 Despite these claims, the notion that absolute regulatory uni-
formity is necessary is eroded by the reality of modern federal and 
state bank regulation.230 CRL notes that lenders are regularly re-
quired to navigate state and local laws, in addition to federal regula-
tions, in many other contexts, and this has not affected their ability to 
provide borrowers with cost-effective products and services.231 Addi-
tionally, in the context of anti-predatory lending laws, there is evi-
dence that the cost to borrowers is not affected by state regulation.232 
For example, in North Carolina, the cost of lending products and ser-
vices did not change after the implementation of NCPLL.233
 Not only is there little support for the notion that state predatory 
lending laws increase the cost of lending, but there is evidence that 
states are more willing and capable enforcers of anti-predatory lend-
ing laws than are federal agencies.234 The Director of the Department 
of Financial Institutions in the State of Washington, Helen P. Howell, 
noted that “in 2002 alone, the states recovered over $500 million in 
restitution and ªnes for predatory lending and other consumer pro-
tection violations, compared to only $7 million collected by the 
OCC.”235 The OCC’s lackadaisical approach to enforcement is also 
evidenced by the fact that the agency has never held a public hearing 
on predatory lending abuses, despite frequent requests to do so.236
                                                                                                                      
227 Id. The vice president for government affairs at the Mortgage Bankers Association 
stated his support for federal preemption and noted that “[e]fªciency in the mortgage 
market relies on uniformity and standardization.” Id. 
228 See id. 
229 See id. 
230 Federal Preemption, supra note 126, at 2. 
231 Id. For example, the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act both 
have complex federal, state, and local regulatory schemes that those in real estate 
ªnancing are able to maneuver. See id.; 15 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3616 (2005); 15 U.S.C. § 1691 
(2005). 
232 See supra Part II.B. 
233 See supra Part II.B. 
234 Ctr. for Responsible Lending, Analysis of OCC Guidelines Establishing 
Standards for Residential Mortgage Lending Practices 4 (2005), available at http:// 
www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/pa-OCC_Guidelines-0205.pdf. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. 
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 One commentator has stated that since asserting preemptive en-
forcement power in predatory lending, the OCC has “done little 
more than what’s necessary for show.”237 One reason for this may be 
that the OCC’s interests are more closely aligned with those of large 
bank chains as opposed to subprime borrowers.238 The OCC’s self-
deªned mission is not to protect borrowers, but is instead to “en-
sur[e] a stable and competitive national banking system.”239 Addi-
tionally, the OCC has reason not to investigate predatory lending 
abuses by nationally chartered banks because the OCC is funded by 
national banks through assessments and fees for special services.240
 In addition to this conºict of interest, the OCC does not have 
sufªcient resources to evaluate suspected predatory lending abuses.241 
For predatory lending investigations, the OCC relies on a staff of na-
tional bank examiners who have full-time duties other than protecting 
borrowers from predatory lending.242 Additionally, only 50 OCC staff 
members are available to receive borrower complaints.243 Meanwhile, 
the OCC received a staggering 78,000 calls from borrowers in 2003.244 
Even if the OCC were properly motivated, the OCC’s resources are 
insufªcient for the enforcement of predatory lending protections.245
 Despite major concerns with both the legitimacy and the wisdom 
of OCC’s preemptive regulation of nationally chartered lending insti-
tutions, the OCC retains the preemptive power they have asserted.246 
States’ efforts to protect their subprime borrowers have been seriously 
hampered by this preemption.247 Consequently, one must consider 
these federally imposed limitations when evaluating the effectiveness 
of state laws, such as Massachusetts’ new law, in protecting borrowers 
from predatory loans. 
                                                                                                                      
237 Keest, supra note 133, at 6. 
238 Eakes Testimony, supra note 126, at 18–19. 
239 Id. at 18. 
240 Id. (noting that “[t]he OCC’s proposed rule is widely viewed as designed to help 
the largest national banks, which conduct business in many states and also happen to pay 
the largest assessments to the OCC”). Id. 
241 Id. at 20–23. 
242 Id. at 20–21. 
243 Eakes Testimony, supra note 126, at 20–21. 
244 Id. 
245 Id. 
246 See supra text accompanying notes 208–11. 
247 See supra text accompanying notes 208–11. 
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III. The Terms of the Massachusetts Law and  
Accompanying Regulations 
 The Predatory Home Loan Practices Act (PHLPA) was approved 
by the Massachusetts legislature on August 9, 2004 and took effect on 
November 7, 2004.248 Similar predatory lending legislation had been 
introduced in 2001, but failed to pass.249 Massachusetts Senator Dianne 
Wilkerson, a supporter of predatory lending reform and sponsor of the 
PHLPA bill, noted that the legislation that would become PHLPA had 
languished on Beacon Hill, the location of Massachusetts’ capital, for 
years without sufªcient support to pass.250 Support for the bill’s passage 
gained momentum in March 2004 shortly after ACORN’s release of its 
2004 comprehensive study of predatory lending.251 The study docu-
mented the dramatically rising levels of predatory lending and its dis-
proportionate effect on minorities.252 The ultimate passage of PHLPA 
can thus be viewed as a result of the legislature’s recognition of the 
emergent need to stop the growth of abusive lending practices.253
 PHLPA is an aggressive response to the abusive lending practices 
that are most harmful to borrowers.254 Perhaps most signiªcantly, 
PHLPA deªnes a “high cost mortgage” loan very broadly.255 High cost 
mortgage loans are deªned as loans that either have annual interest 
rates in excess of 8% the yield on U.S. Treasury securities or have total 
points and fees in excess of the greater of 5% of the total loan amount 
or $400.256 Thus, PHLPA deªnes high cost mortgage loans similarly to 
NCPLL, eschewing HOEPA’s much more narrow deªnition.257
 In addition to broadly deªning high cost home mortgage loans, 
the restrictions on these loans are very protective of Massachusetts’ 
                                                                                                                      
248 Predatory Home Loan Practices Act, 2004 Mass. Acts 268. 
249 Jon Chesto, Predatory-Lending Bill Nears, Boston Herald, May 20, 2003, at 29. The 
2001 predatory lending legislation may have failed, in part, because the Massachusetts 
banking regulatory agency had passed predatory lending rules in that year. Id. The state’s 
agency regulations were viewed by supporters of PHLPA as neither comprehensive nor 
permanent enough to protect Massachusetts’ borrowers. Id. 
250 Thomas Grillo, Bill to Curb Predatory Lending Backed, Boston Globe, Mar. 15, 2004, 
at B2 (describing support for the PHLPA bill). 
251 Id. 
252 Id. 
253 See id. 
254 See Predatory Home Loan Practices Act, 2004 Mass. Acts 268. 
255 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183C, § 2 (2004). 
256 Id. Subordinate-lien loans, as opposed to ªrst-lien loans, are considered high-cost 
loans if their interest rates exceed the yield on U.S. Treasury securities by more than 9%, 
rather than 8%. Id. 
257 See supra Part II.A–B. 
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subprime borrowers.258 One of the substantial protections of borrowers 
who take on high cost loans is the requirement of third-party counsel-
ing.259 Chapter 183C § 3 states that “[a] creditor may not make a high-
cost home mortgage loan without ªrst receiving certiªcation from a 
counselor with a third-party nonproªt organization . . . that the bor-
rower has received counseling on the advisability of the loan transac-
tion.”260 This requirement for counseling is somewhat analogous to the 
“three day waiting period” that is required by HOEPA prior to closing a 
loan.261 The requirement of counseling also forces a borrower to con-
sider the loan agreement over a longer period of time and reduces the 
effectiveness of high pressure sales techniques.262 The counseling re-
quirement is more protective than a mere waiting period, however, be-
cause it compels a borrower to discuss the beneªts and harms of a loan 
with an expert who may clarify hidden pitfalls that would not be appar-
ent to the average borrower.263
 The counseling requirement, though beneªcial, is not a panacea. 
For instance, counseling does not cure harms caused by a lender who 
uses outright deception by changing terms immediately before clos-
ing.264 Additionally, a recent comprehensive study by Stephen P. Horn-
burg of the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University re-
vealed that relatively little is known about the impact and efªcacy of 
counseling.265 One study conducted in 2001 suggested that one must be 
skeptical of the ability of mortgage counseling to solve lending problems 
associated with deeply ingrained racism.266 Another study, more opti-
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Americans in the lending industry in the early part of the 1900’s. Id. at 13. The study sug-
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Americans are credit risks. Id. The researchers thus conclude that counseling cannot com-
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mistically indicates that mortgage counseling increases the likelihood 
that borrowers will shop around for the most beneªcial loan terms.267 
Although counseling will not abolish predatory lending, it is an impor-
tant tool for educating borrowers and is, therefore, a critical piece of 
PHLPA’s reforms.268
 PHLPA also prohibits lenders from making high cost mortgage 
loans to borrowers whom lenders know will be unable to make pay-
ments on the offered loan.269 PHLPA accomplishes this by requiring 
lenders to have a reasonable belief that a borrower “will be able to 
make the scheduled payments to repay the home loan” based upon a 
number of ªnancial factors.270 This prohibition should protect borrow-
ers from unscrupulous lenders who make loans that borrowers will be 
unable to pay with the intention of foreclosing the equity at stake.271
 One possible concern with this provision, however, is that it does 
not provide lenders with clear guidance on how to determine whether 
a borrower will or will not be able to make loan payments.272 This lack 
of a clear guidance could have the unintended consequence of reduc-
ing the amount of credit available because a lender may be hesitant to 
offer high cost loans to borderline borrowers in unclear cases.273 A 
lack of clear guidance may also increase the cost of lending by requir-
ing lenders to make time-consuming evaluations of the borrower’s 
ability to pay.274
 Concerns about the unpredictability of the application of this “rea-
sonable belief” standard are mitigated by the presence of a statutory 
presumption of lender compliance if certain requirements are sa-
tisªed.275 There is a presumption that a lender reasonably believes that 
a borrower is able to pay the amount of the loan if the borrower’s 
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scheduled monthly payments combined with scheduled payments for 
all other debts do not exceed 50% of the borrower’s monthly gross in-
come.276 Because a responsible lender can quickly determine whether 
the borrower’s debts are greater than 50% of their income, a compliant 
lender is shielded by the presumption and need not worry about an 
unpredictable application of the reasonable belief standard in court.277
 Another signiªcant feature of PHLPA is its prohibition against 
lenders knowingly reªnancing a home loan that was “consummated 
within the prior 60 months . . . unless the reªnancing is in the bor-
rower’s interest.”278 This provision prevents lenders from engaging in 
“ºipping,” which is the reªnancing of a home mortgage loan for the 
sole purpose of extracting fees from borrowers without providing any 
beneªt to the borrower.279 Victims of ºipping are often left in a worse 
position after reªnancing because of the excessive fees that accom-
pany subprime reªnance loans.280 The anti-ºipping provision is an 
integral part of PHLPA because even fees that seem acceptable can 
become abusive if they are compounded by multiple, unnecessary 
reªnances.281
 PHLPA governs not only the terms of home mortgage loans, but 
also remedies for victims of lender violations of PHLPA.282 Section 13 
of PHLPA states that any provision of a home mortgage loan that re-
quires a borrower to assert a claim or defense in “a forum that is less 
convenient, more costly, or more dilatory for the resolution of a dispute 
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281 See id. 
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than a judicial forum . . . is unconscionable and void.”283 Section 13 
thus prevents lenders from forcing borrowers to pursue their claims 
through arbitration.284 This is so even where the loan had a mandatory 
arbitration clause, provided that arbitration is found to be “less conven-
ient, more costly, or more dilatory.”285 PHLPA’s protection of a bor-
rower’s right to bring a claim in court is a progressive feature that is not 
present in many of the other strong predatory lending laws.286
 The protection that PHLPA provides to Bay State borrowers 
equals, or exceeds, the protections of comparable acts, such as 
NCPLL.287 Due to the similarity of PHLPA’s major terms to those of 
NCPLL, one should expect North Carolina’s success in diminishing the 
impact of predatory lending in their state to translate into similar suc-
cess in Massachusetts.288 Some uncertainty remains, however, because 
success requires not only effective law, but sustained and aggressive en-
forcement as well.289
Conclusion 
 Predatory lending robs homeowners and their families of hard 
earned equity. This problem disproportionately affects minorities, 
low-income families, the elderly, and their respective communities. 
Undoubtedly, anti-predatory lending laws cannot eliminate the un-
derlying racial and socio-economic discrimination that permeates the 
subprime lending industry. Nonetheless, strong anti-predatory lend-
ing laws can alleviate the effects of that discrimination on already vul-
nerable populations through strict regulation of subprime lending. 
 In Massachusetts, PHLPA provides strong protections against 
predatory lending by following the example of strong and proven 
state laws such as NCPLL. With vigilant enforcement, PHLPA has the 
capacity to substantially reduce predatory lending in Massachusetts, 
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just as NCPLL did in North Carolina. A reduction in predatory lend-
ing will strengthen low-income, minority, and elderly communities in 
profound ways. By returning equity to individuals in these communi-
ties, once dilapidated neighborhoods can become safe and vibrant 
places to live. PHLPA stands, not only as a strong measure against un-
just lending practices, but also a strong measure against the discrimi-
nation that unjust lending practices often entail. 
 Despite strong predatory lending protections, Massachusetts is un-
able to regulate a large portion of loans—those made by nationally 
chartered lending institutions and their subsidiaries. Nationally char-
tered institutions remain virtually unregulated as a result of the weak 
federal standards of HOEPA and the unwillingness of federal agencies, 
such as the OCC, to investigate or prosecute predatory lending prac-
tices. The United States Congress must take action to bring nationally 
chartered banks and their subsidiaries into the purview of meaningful 
regulation. Congress could accomplish this by overruling the preemp-
tive actions of the OCC and returning regulatory oversight to the states 
or by enacting a stronger federal predatory lending law. 
